A family living in Public Works Administration housing in 1937. The writer and organizer Catherin Bauer wanted a system that would go further than simply providing affordable places to live.Photograph from AP
The celebrated urbanist Jane Jacobs never hesitated to name an adversary in print. In “The Death and Life of Great American Cities,” from 1961, she takes special care to criticize Catherine Bauer, the most influential member of a cadre of city planners that Jacobs calls “the Decentrists,” though they were more commonly known as “the housers.” Jacobs accused Bauer and her circle of wanting to stifle the organic growth of cities, siphoning their tumultuous energy into sterile satellite settlements that “resist future change,” since “every significant detail must be controlled by the planners from the start and then stuck to.”
Sixty years later, Jacobs’s paean to city life, still in wide circulation, is the place readers are likeliest to encounter Bauer’s name. They might reasonably picture a city planner in the mold of Robert Moses—Jacobs’ most famous opponent, who fought to build a highway through Greenwich Village—though in fact Bauer disliked Moses’ ideas almost as much as Jacobs did. Jacobs presented a democratic vision of urban neighborhoods, in which self-governance naturally gave rise to good places to live; Bauer, by contrast, wanted the state to play the role of both developer and landlord. The planned communities of Bauer’s imagination were indeed designed to resist a form of change: the creeping increase of property values that put decent housing out of reach for many Americans. Jacobs had faith that the old buildings in places like Greenwich Village, as long as they were left standing, would remain affordable. Bauer, convinced the market would always compel people to pay too much for too little, better anticipated the world we live in today.
Bauer’s only major book, “Modern Housing,” published in 1934, was a staple of college reading lists when Jacobs lambasted the housers’ “city-destroying ideas” in “Death and Life.” It spent decades out of print, until its reissue this past April, by the University of Minnesota Press, into the teeth of an economic disaster that may prove as dire as the one that shaped its author. When the stock market crashed in 1929, Bauer was a twenty-four-year-old architecture critic; the beginnings of the Great Depression propelled what she later described as her development from “an aesthete into a housing reformer.” In “Modern Housing,” Bauer makes the case for what critics at the time denounced, more or less accurately, as socialized housing, although she herself framed the issue as a matter of making decent housing a “public utility” and a basic right. She did not think, however, that writing books alone would bring her vision into being. “Movements are not made, when all is said and done, by a handful of specialists,” she writes in the final pages. Change would come only when Americans “demanded a positive program of good housing—not merely for some vague, hypothetical ‘slum-dwellers,’ but for themselves and their families.” After the book’s publication, Bauer put aside her literary career to become a labor organizer and political lobbyist, working to drum up the broad demand she found wanting. She fought to encode her ideas in the New Deal, and largely failed.
In our current economic crisis, there are signs of the kind of mass housing movement that never materialized during the Great Depression. Across the country, activists are urging elected officials to cancel the rent. More than seven hundred and ninety thousand households have gone on rent strike since March, according to the housing-justice coalition We Strike Together, and it seems likely that more will join them when pandemic unemployment assistance runs dry. Many state-level eviction moratoriums are set to expire this summer, and one real-estate analytics firm estimates that twenty-eight million renters may soon be at risk of being turned onto the streets. Black and Latino tenants, more than half of whom were “cost-burdened” before the pandemic—meaning they devoted more than thirty per cent of their earnings to keeping a roof over their families’ heads—will disproportionately struggle to hold onto their homes. Could the cruelty of evicting people in a pandemic finally elevate the demand for a right to housing into a mainstream political issue?
Bauer once wrote, in letters quoted in the architectural historian Barbara Penner’s new foreword to “Modern Housing,” that planners and experts could offer, at best, “something to stir up the imagination” and “strike the spark” to ignite broad desire for change. Almost a century later, the ideas in her book still burn. She draws her utopian image of a different America in so much detail that it begins to feel like a real destination. Republished at an opportune moment, her dispatch from another crisis provides context, and perhaps inspiration, for a movement whose like she desperately longed to see.
Bauer grew up unconcerned about shelter. She was born in 1905 to upper-middle-class parents—her father was a highway engineer—and raised in a three-story house in Elizabeth, New Jersey, a suburb of New York. After graduating from Vassar College in 1926, she discovered modernism on a European tour. She felt drawn to the social ideals expressed in functionalist buildings by architects like Le Corbusier, who famously called a house a “machine” that should generate maximal well being. Bauer was tall and blond, with a frank charisma; “she walked with an enormous stride—you had to run to keep up with her—and always smoked,” one acquaintance remembered. She also possessed a gift for getting to know the right people. Out dancing in Paris, she met the famous Viennese architect Adolf Loos and persuaded him to hire her by the end of the evening. Back in New York, she kept company with artists like Alfred Stieglitz and Georgia O’Keeffe, and began to make her name as a writer.
Her door to the subject that would define her life was a love affair with an older man. In 1929, she met the acclaimed cultural critic Lewis Mumford, who wrote about cities and architecture for The New Yorker, and who would be the “potter,” she once wrote, to her “clay.” The intellectual influence ran both ways: Mumford once wrote that Bauer was “the only pupil and collaborator whom I fully respected.” He introduced her to the Regional Planning Association of America (R.P.A.A.), a star-studded group that included the architects Henry Wright and Clarence Stein and the housing reformer Edith Elmer Wood, and which advocated for American housing that reflected the principles of the English Garden City movement, a plan to create bucolic but socially vibrant suburbs.
Mumford also helped Bauer arrange two trips to Europe to study modernist housing, the second of which they took together, funded by Fortune magazine, which had commissioned Mumford to write a five-article series on European architecture. He brought Bauer as his assistant, which in practice meant that she researched and wrote drafts that appeared, with his edits, under his sole byline. Bauer and Mumford, soon to break up, spent the trip at loggerheads, but were aligned in their aim to mount an argument for the kind of state-subsidized housing then on the rise in countries like England, the Netherlands, and Austria. Their leftist politics scandalized the conservative Fortune, which cancelled the project after three installments. Bauer decided to turn her research into a book in her own name.
“Modern Housing” begins with a history of the Depression-era housing crisis that will sound familiar to contemporary readers. The supposed prosperity of the nineteen-twenties masked rising rents, stagnant wages, and a significant shortage of low-income and middle-class housing. Only the “upper-third income group” could afford the new homes being built, Bauer writes. The problem, she argues, was not so much the real-estate industry as the basic function of the free market. The cost of housing is tied to the value of land, which is determined by “the most intensive”—which is to say, overcrowded—“future use to which a speculator estimates that the plot can be put.” The price of land thus reflects “the lowest housing standards permissible,” driving down standards of living even for the affluent, and consigning the poor to the slums. This is the basis of Bauer’s core argument, which is that housing must be decommodified. Good housing that is “available to the average citizen is not a ‘normal’ product of a capitalist society,” she writes.
The dwellings Bauer aspired to see in America, which she terms “modern housing,” must therefore be “non-speculative”: owned by public entities or nonprofit coöperatives. They must be affordable, with the help of government subsidies, to people on the lowest incomes, while also attracting middle-class residents, who will find them airier and more attractive than the free-market alternatives. That these groups should have access to equal amenities was axiomatic for Bauer. “If you start with sun and air and biological requirements, you cannot say that because this family has only half the income of that family, they should have only half as good an outlook or half as big a playground or half as much water or half a toilet,” she writes. Modern housing cannot be designed one building at a time but rather must be conceived as a town or neighborhood, a practice that controls costs while maximizing shared green space, granting “sunlight, quiet, and a pleasant outlook from every window.”
“Modern Housing” was not only a proposal of something new, but also a rejection of what it would replace. “The ideology of individual Home Ownership must go,” Bauer proclaimed. The idea that every American, if he worked hard enough, could someday afford his own plot of land was part of “the realm of mythology,” she wrote—and the Depression had revealed it to be a damaging myth, as half of all mortgages entered default, wiping out the life savings of millions of families. Culturally, Bauer believed that aspiring to homeownership encouraged people “to approach the housing problem in the role of petty capitalists rather than as workers and consumers,” stifling solidarity between people who might benefit from a different system. She concluded her book: “If only a small part of the vast energy which was once directed toward individual home-ownership were now organized to demand a realistic program of modern housing, … then there would be an American housing movement indeed.”
As Bauer was writing “Modern Housing,” the U.S. was beginning to build public housing as part of the Public Works Administration. From the start, the new projects hinted at the troubled place they would hold in American life. Due to a deliberate policy of building housing for Black people in what the agency designated Black neighborhoods, the new developments intensified segregation in cities, or sometimes created it. At the same time, the historian Radford notes that P.W.A. projects for both Black and white residents were far better funded than the public housing of future eras, and were seen as desirable places to live.
The P.W.A. was a temporary agency, but many hoped it would give way to a permanent policy of public housing. The most sustained advocacy arose in the labor movement, which recruited Bauer to lead a new lobbying arm, the Labor Housing Conference, and sent her around the country in search of supporters. “It’s a long jump from a Radical Intellectual to a Labor Skate,” she wrote to a friend from the road, where she lived in cheap hotels or with friends on a budget of six dollars a day. “My old arty self of 1927-Paris would commit suicide at the spectacle—if she were not so thoroughly dead.” In 1935, Senator Robert Wagner, of New York, enlisted Bauer to help draw up a housing bill. The draft legislation would have funded developments for middle- and low-income Americans. Perhaps most radically, Bauer wrote, it included “machinery whereby groups of people who desire to secure better housing for themselves may participate directly in the program,” by forming coöperatives and applying to the government to build developments that they would live in, but not own. The law would have granted tenants control of their surroundings that only homeowners have ever enjoyed.
Bauer’s timing was off. The real-estate industry, on its knees only a few years earlier, had been revived by the New Deal invention of federally backed mortgages, which continue to benefit homeowners today. It succeeded in quashing Bauer’s vision. By the time the U.S. Housing Act passed in 1937, its purview was confined to the poor, a clientele that the real-estate lobby cared little about losing. Like the P.W.A. projects, the new housing would be racially segregated—an abomination that none of the bill’s authors, including Bauer, insisted against. Bauer did try and fail to prevent an amendment tying public housing to so-called slum clearance, which confined most new developments to run-down neighborhoods and left developers the more desirable land in the suburbs. The bill also capped the construction cost of each new dwelling at levels far below the standard set by the P.W.A. Instead of challenging the primacy of private ownership, the resulting housing attached stigma to the idea of a public alternative. As Bauer later wrote, most American public housing “proclaims, visually, that it serves the ‘lowest income group.’ ”
As we face the possibility of repeating this battle, it’s worth knowing what happened last time, and how close we came to living in a different world. As Radford observes, Bauer hoped to tackle the housing crisis with a universalist policy that might have united the poor and the middle class in broad support of a new entitlement. Instead, the New Deal ushered in a two-tiered system that persists to this day: generous tax deductions for the most secure homeowners, and underfunded public housing for the least fortunate. “America’s national housing policy gives affluent homeowners large benefits; middle-class homeowners, smaller benefits; and most renters, who are disproportionately poor, nothing,” the Princeton sociologist Matthew Desmond has written. “It is difficult to think of another social policy that more successfully multiplies America’s inequality.”
The gulf is growing wider in the pandemic. The cares Act granted anyone with a federally backed mortgage—about seventy per cent of mortgages—the ability to pause payments for up to a year. In June, the real-estate-data-analytics firm Black Knight calculated that the accumulated unpaid principal added up to a trillion-dollar bailout so far. In comparison, the cares Act earmarked twelve billion dollars for housing, almost all of which was directed to public and subsidized housing and services for the homeless, leaving virtually nothing for low-income tenants struggling to stave off eviction from market-rate rentals.
As in the New Deal era, the map to a different society is sitting on the table, already written. Representative Ilhan Omar has drawn up a bill to cancel rent and mortgage payments for as long as the crisis lasts; Senator Elizabeth Warren wrote another that would halt evictions through March, 2021. In November, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Bernie Sanders introduced the Green New Deal for Public Housing, a plan to update and decarbonize more than a million units. Just under a week later, Omar introduced the Homes for All Act, a trillion-dollar plan to build twelve million new units of affordable housing—enough to serve the more than ten million Americans, disproportionately Black and Latino, who spend more than half their income on rent. Omar worked with People’s Action, a progressive coalition of grassroots groups; their proposal for a “Homes Guarantee” would build social housing, institute rent control, and pay reparations to Black and Native Americans and other groups harmed by racist housing policies. As Tara Raghuveer, the group’s housing policy lead, said in September, “The theory of the Homes Guarantee is that the market failure has been so profound, we can’t wait around for the market to work.”
Conventional wisdom has it that Americans will never embrace plans like these, that they aspire instead to all the freedoms embodied in one’s own plot of land. Bauer agreed with Jacobs that the power to shape one’s surroundings was paramount; she called “Death and Life” “brilliant,” despite the way it pressed her into service as a useful foil. A home is an intimate incarnation of an individual life, even if it is provided by public means. “Freedom and flexibility are probably the hardest things to achieve with public policy,” Bauer wrote in 1957. “But a country that can devise the insured mortgage (in all its different forms)” can surely “provide some real selection at all economic and social levels.”
It’s easy to abandon hope that we will ever accomplish what “Modern Housing” prescribes, but the book prompts us to remember that history is never as predictable as it looks in hindsight. Bauer emphasizes that there was “no ‘inevitability’” preventing achievements like those of Europe: it took a political movement, including mass protests, to create social housing. Bauer’s defeat wasn’t preordained, either. Radford, finding evidence of excitement about modern housing among union members in the thirties, argues that Bauer simply didn’t have enough time to amass the necessary grassroots support. Picturing a world where she did is a ward against cynicism. The New Deal helped tie homeownership to success in our national imagination. But a country where no one would have to fight for a home is also a longstanding American dream.
In a Monty Python sketch from 1970, a cheesy game show host (John Cleese) asks an ill-tempered, racist, uncooperative old lady contestant (Terry Jones) a ludicrously challenging question. The exchange unfolds as follows:
Cleese: What great opponent of Cartesian dualism resists the reduction of psychological phenomena to physical states? Jones: I don’t know that! Cleese: Well, have a guess. Jones: Henri Bergson. Cleese: Is the correct answer! Jones: Ooh, that was lucky. I never even heard of him!
The Pythons were well-versed in the history of philosophy (and in the drinking habits of Western philosophers). It therefore didn’t escape them that this particular French philosopher was also the author of a popular essay that focused on a phenomenon all comedians take very seriously: laughter.
The Monty Pythons could safely assume that Bergson’s name would come across as particularly obscure to an anglophone audience – the sketch plays on the incongruity of the old lady plucking this unfamiliar name from the air. However, when Bergson’s Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic (1900) was published, his philosophy was discussed in most intellectual circles and, a few years later, he would become one of the most famous thinkers in the world. Why did a philosopher of such renown deviate from his more traditional and serious philosophical obsessions – the nature of time, memory, perception, free will and the mind-body problem – to focus on the apparently frivolous case-studies of slapstick, vaudeville and word play? And what was there to be gained from such analysis? The topic was a ticklish one. Laughter, wrote Bergson, had ‘a knack of baffling every effort, of slipping away and escaping only to bob up again, a pert challenge flung at philosophic speculation’. It was almost as though there was something unnatural about subjecting one of the most pleasurable and ubiquitous human experiences to dry philosophical speculation. Anyone who has ever had to explain their own joke knows that comedy cannot survive that sort of analysis. As the American authors E B White and Katharine S White put it in 1941:
Humour can be dissected, as a frog can, but the thing dies in the process and the innards are discouraging to any but the purely scientific mind.
While his book on laughter is hardly a rib-tickling read, Bergson didn’t wish to adopt the attitude of an anatomist observing a frog’s dead insides. He believed that laughter should be studied as ‘a living thing’ and treated ‘with the respect due to life’. His investigation was therefore more like that of a field zoologist observing frogs in the wild:
we shall not aim at imprisoning the comic spirit within a definition … We shall confine ourselves to watching it grow and expand.
Like all good metaphorical field zoologists, Bergson started his study by familiarising himself with his metaphorical frog’s natural habitat: in other words, the conditions under which laughter is most likely to appear and thrive. Following this method, Bergson arrived at three general observations.
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The first one, according to Bergson, was so ‘important’ and ‘simple’ that he was surprised it hadn’t attracted more attention from philosophers: ‘The comic does not exist outside the pale of what is strictly human.’ When Bergson wrote these words, he couldn’t have foreseen that, a century later, through the power of the internet, one of the most popular forms of comedy would be provided by our own pets in the form of viral videos, memes and gifs. But, in a way, he anticipated it in what he wrote about laughter directed at non-humans:
You may laugh at an animal, but only because you have detected in it some human attitude or expression.
Consider for instance the viral sensation of Grumpy Cat (now sadly deceased). Her perpetual scowl makes us laugh because it is relatably human. The essence of her comedy lies in the fact that she is a humanlike cat. The same goes for inanimate objects that make us laugh. The American vaudeville performer Will Rogers once quipped: ‘An onion can make people cry but there’s never been a vegetable that can make people laugh.’ Enter the internet with its millions of more-or-less safe for work anthropomorphic vegetable content to prove him wrong. According to Bergson, it is possible to laugh at vegetables and nonsentient things, but only on the condition that we are able to detect the human in them:
You may laugh at a hat, but what you are making fun of, in this case, is not the piece of felt or straw, but the shape that men have given it, – the human caprice whose mould it has assumed.
Bergson’s second observation might appear counterintuitive to anyone who has been reduced to tears by a fit of uncontrollable giggles: ‘Laughter has no greater foe than emotion.’ But his point was that certain emotional states – pity, melancholy, rage, fear, etc – make it difficult for us to find the humour in things we might otherwise have laughed at (even anthropomorphic vegetables). We instinctively know that there are situations in which it is best to refrain from laughing. Those who choose to ignore these unspoken rules are immediately sanctioned, as the American comedian Gilbert Gottfried learned the hard way. While most major US late-night comedy shows halted production in the weeks following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Gottfried provided a textbook case of a joke being ‘too soon’ during a comedy roast that took place before the month had ended:
I have to leave early tonight, I have a flight to California. I can’t get a direct flight – they said I have to stop at the Empire State Building first.
The comedian later recalled: ‘I don’t think anyone’s lost an audience bigger than I did at that point.’ Bergson would say that the emotional stakes were too high to allow for the ‘momentary anaesthesia of the heart’ that laughter demands. For laughter to occur, we must shift our perspective such that we find ourselves in the position of a ‘disinterested spectator’.
‘Why are obtuse angles so depressed? Because they’re never right’
This is not to say that it’s impossible to laugh in times of hardship. In many cases, humour appears to serve as a coping mechanism in the face of tragedy or misfortune. In 1999, as he was being carried out of his house on a stretcher after a crazed fan stabbed him, the former Beatle George Harrison asked a newly hired employee: ‘So what do you think of the job so far?’ On his death bed, Voltaire allegedly told a priest who was exhorting him to renounce Satan: ‘This is no time for making new enemies.’ Following Bergson’s logic, perhaps in some cases humour is cathartic precisely because it forces us to look at things from a detached perspective.
Finally, laughter ‘appears to stand in need of an echo’, according to Bergson. Evolutionary theorists have hypothesised about the adaptive value of laughter, in particular in the context of social bonding. Laughter might have emerged as a prelinguistic signal of safety or belonging within a group. Laughter and humour continue to play an important role in our various social groups. Most countries, regions and cities share a wide repertoire of jokes at the expense of their neighbours. For example, this Belgian dig at my compatriots, the French: ‘After God created France, he thought it was the most beautiful country in the world. People were going to get jealous, so to make things fair he decided to create the French.’
Jokes need not be nationalistic or even derogatory in nature to facilitate social bonding. Most friends share ‘in-jokes’ that are meant to be understood only within the context of their particular social group, as do certain communities brought together by a football team, political opinions or shared specialist knowledge (‘Why are obtuse angles so depressed? Because they’re never right’). Our laughter ‘is always the laughter of a group’, as Bergson put it. Even in those cases when we are effectively laughing alone, to, or perhaps at ourselves, laughter always presupposes an imagined audience or community.
Bergson’s observations tell us where to find laughter, under which conditions it is possible for laughter to emerge, but they don’t tell us why we laugh. They do nonetheless provide us with important clues. It is no accident that we laugh exclusively at other humans, and that laughter is a communal experience: its purpose, or ‘function’, wrote Bergson, is social. In addition, it isn’t by chance that laughter requires a temporary shutdown of our emotions: though pleasurable, laughter is above all punitive. But what, or whom, is laughter punishing, and how does it do that? To understand Bergson’s reasoning, we need to make a rapid detour to examine his philosophy of life.
Less than a decade after Laughter was published, Bergson had moved on to one of the pressing issues of the day: biological evolution. In his surprise bestseller Creative Evolution (1907), Bergson describes life as an ever-changing, creative (ie, producing entirely new and unpredictable forms) and spontaneous movement. In this sense, life exhibits the opposite of the mechanical tendencies of inert matter characterised by rigidity, predictability and repetitiveness. At the same time, life and matter are inexorably intertwined. Using metaphorical language, Bergson describes life as an ‘effort’, a ‘vital impetus’ constantly striving to break free from its own material constraints through ever more sophisticated evolutionary innovations. However, said Bergson, ‘most often this effort turns short’. Throughout the history of life, organisms that have failed to adapt to environmental challenges have gone extinct. Both at the individual and at the species level, survival has depended on organisms’ ability to demonstrate ‘a certain elasticity’, enough adaptability to find ways around material obstacles.
These questions were already on Bergson’s mind when he was writing Laughter. He envisioned the comical, and the laughter it provokes, as a sophisticated solution to a particularly human problem. As a product of biological evolution, human societies were also concerned with the struggle between vital and material (or mechanistic) tendencies. Social life, wrote Bergson, requires a ‘delicate adjustment of wills’ and constant ‘reciprocal adaptation’ between the members of the group. Society therefore needs its members to display ‘the greatest possible degree of elasticity and sociability’, and needs to guard itself against ‘a certain rigidity of body, mind and character’. These ossified expressions of human life are, according to Bergson, at the source of the comical, because this is precisely what laughter seeks to correct. Rather than a definition of the comical, Bergson arrived at a ‘leitmotiv’, a common thread uniting various forms of comedy: in general, we laugh at ‘something mechanical encrusted on the living’. A few examples will help illuminate this point.
A man is walking down the street, he slips and falls. Hilarity ensues. Why are benign blunders of this nature almost always funny? According to Bergson, it is the involuntary nature of the action that makes us laugh. Stumbles, gaffes, slipups, bloopers and general clumsiness indicate both a lack of versatility and of awareness: ‘where one would expect to find the wideawake adaptability and the living pliableness of a human being’, we find instead ‘a certain mechanical inelasticity’.
Consider a scene from the classic film Modern Times (1936) in which Charlie Chaplin plays a factory worker subjected to the relentless cadence of an assembly line. Even outside the factory, he continues to erratically tighten imaginary bolts, stuck in the repetitive movement he has been executing all day. In Bergsonian terms, this is funny because we are seeing someone act out deeply engrained habits even though the circumstances demand otherwise. Both in the case of accidental blunders and in carefully choreographed slapstick comedy, we are laughing at figures who lack ‘elasticity’, who are mechanically following a predetermined trajectory and therefore fail to adapt to their surroundings.
Critics gushed that she had reinvented comedy yet one of the funniest scenes of Fleabag is a fart joke
In an iconic scene from the Marx Brothers’ comedy Duck Soup (1933), we see two characters (played by Harpo and Groucho Marx) dressed identically, positioned either side of a missing mirror. To trick Groucho into thinking that he is looking at his own reflection, Harpo copies his every move. According to Bergson, laughter targets cases in which life appears to have lost its vitality and adopts instead the logic of matter and machines. For instance, according to Bergson, in nature, life never truly repeats itself. There will never be two truly identical living beings (even twins don’t share the exact same experiences). Therefore, ‘wherever there is repetition or complete similarity, we always suspect some mechanism’, he writes, and when this repetition takes, in one way or another, a human form, we are (potentially) in the presence of the comical. Both fortuitous resemblance (for instance, the uncanny likeness between the actor Adam Driver and yet another internet cat) and skilful impersonation are funny because they remind us of mechanically produced copies. It is, writes Bergson, ‘this deflection of life towards the mechanical’ that ‘is here the real cause of laughter’.
Interestingly, Bergson considers that the same kind of logic applies to wordplay. Much word-based humour consists in taking literally words and phrases we would normally use figuratively (‘I have the heart of a lion, and a lifetime ban from the Toronto zoo’). By subverting the meaning and common usage of words, these jokes reveal what is ‘ready-made’, habitual, and therefore mechanical, about language. In other words, puns and witticisms expose the material limits and the mechanical rigidity of language. Both in the case of the human body and the ‘body’ of language, the rigidity that’s suggested is at odds with the flexibility, malleability and adaptability that life, and especially social life, require of us.
In a rare moment of perspicacity, the male supermodel Derek Zoolander (portrayed by Ben Stiller in the eponymous 2001 comedy) reflects: ‘Did you ever think that maybe there’s more to life than being really, really, really ridiculously good looking?’ For Bergson, vanity is one of the most laughable traits. In the same way that a lack of awareness of one’s material surroundings can result in (often comical) physical injuries, an unhealthy obsession with oneself denotes a lack of awareness of others, which can in turn damage society. This damage is subtle and therefore, he writes, requires a subtle antidote:
vanity, though it is a natural product of social life, is an inconvenience to society, just as certain slight poisons, continually secreted by the human organism, would destroy it in the long run if they were not neutralised by other secretions. Laughter is unceasingly doing work of this kind.
In other words, according to Bergson, laughter serves a social function: its purpose is to gently but firmly correct these socially ‘inconvenient’ attitudes. We laugh at people who are either too eccentric or too inflexible to allow for society to evolve and better itself. It is in this sense that laughter is punitive:
society holds suspended over each individual member, if not the threat of correction, at all events the prospect of a snubbing, which although it is slight, is none the less dreaded. Such must be the function of laughter.
But for Bergson, laughter doesn’t exclusively punish attitudes that we deem reprehensible. Homer Simpson’s morally irreproachable neighbour Ned Flanders is proof that even virtue can be ridiculous when portrayed as a form of mental rigidity. Laughter awakens us to the inelasticity of certain personality traits or behaviours and, in doing so, dissuades us from becoming too settled in our own ways.
Bergson’s critics have complained that his theory of humour is too restrictive, that his repetitive characterisation of the comedic as ‘something mechanical encrusted upon the living’ becomes laughable in its own terms, trying to fit a complex and spontaneous living phenomenon under the same rigid formula. But Bergson claimed that, rather than a clear-cut definition, this formula was a ‘leitmotiv’: representations of mechanised life constitute a common thread in many different forms of comedy. His theory didn’t preclude that we might laugh at things that are not obviously mechanical, nor that the mechanical might not be the only source of laughter. What mattered to Bergson was to understand laughter as a product and a part of life.
By giving comedy the attention it deserved, Bergson opened new perspectives on difficult philosophical questions about the relationship between biology and art, the evolution of human societies, and our own humanity. The philosopher recognised that laughter doesn’t always bring out the best in us – it can be used to mock and degrade others. But at its core, its function is to remind us that to be human is to be alive and free. Bergson’s book on laughter therefore raised the status of a problem that has often been deemed unworthy of serious philosophical study. In Monty Python’s Flying Circus (2008), the film scholar Darl Larsen writes that Bergson’s theory ‘seems to have been an influential work on the Pythons’ because, by proposing a theory of laughter, ‘the respected Bergson elevated the study of comedy to a more academic level, worthy of study in works looking at aesthetics and philosophies of art forms’. In another sketch, Cleese (playing a reporter) is caught on air mid-conversation explaining that he adheres ‘to the Bergsonian idea of laughter as a social sanction against inflexible behaviour’. This was perhaps the Pythons’ way of paying homage to Bergson: despite all its silliness, they too believed that comedy should be taken dead seriously.